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Why do family firms congregate in certain industries? 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
We propose that family firm involvement and performance across industries is not random 
and is related to specific industry conditions. Using the population of listed companies on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2007 we find that family firms are more 
involved in industries with more fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view of family 
owners, and in industry conditions that make it potentially easier for family owners to 
consume private benefits of control. Overall, we document a positive relationship between 
family firm involvement and performance, which indicates a net advantage for family firm 
shareholders in industries where family firms congregate. However, we also find that family 
firm performance is negatively affected when family firms use more debt and maintain a 
higher control wedge than their industry counterparts.  
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1. Introduction 
Family firms are an integral part of most economies around the world, comprising an average 
of 59% of listed firms in Asia (ex-Japan) and 44% in Europe (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). However, little is known about the involvement and performance of family 
firms across industries. If there are no industry effects, family firms should be randomly 
distributed across industries. However, if family firms are better suited to certain industry 
conditions, we should find clustering of family firms in these industries and performance 
differentials between family and non-family firms. In this study we propose that family firm 
involvement and performance across industries is not random and is related to a number of 
specific industry conditions. 
 Prior studies have documented differences between family and non-family firms. For 
example, James (1999) shows that family owners generally take a long-term view of the 
success of the company, which allows for greater investment in fixed assets (Doukas et al., 
2009). Faccio and Parsley (2009) find that family firms make better use of political and 
business connections, which can result in greater access to debt financing and tax concessions 
from government (Faccio, 2006). Numerous studies also indicate that consumption of private 
benefits of control is higher in family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 
2003; Dahya et al., 2008). These studies illustrate that family firms can provide shareholders 
with comparative advantages and disadvantages relative to non-family firms.  
We investigate whether family firms are more involved in industries where there is a 
better match to their comparative advantages and where there is greater potential for family 
owners to consume private benefits of control. For example, since family owners are more 
willing to invest in fixed assets and have greater access to debt financing, we examine 
whether family firms are more involved in industries that require more fixed assets and debt. 
Since industries with greater uncertainty and less external monitoring provide more potential 
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for family owners to consume private benefits of control, we examine whether family firm 
participation is higher in industries with these characteristics. In addition to family firm 
involvement across industries, we also examine family firm performance. This allows us to 
examine whether the greater involvement of family firms in these industries is associated 
with a performance advantage relative to non-family firms. 
We make significant advances on previous research by being the first to examine the 
involvement and performance of family firms across industries using the entire population of 
listed companies and over an 11-year period. Villalonga and Amit (2009) draw implications 
about the family control of industries in the United States using a sample of 26 percent of 
listed companies in a single year. We examine family firms in Taiwan, a non-US market with 
high family ownership and relatively lower investor protection, which is more representative 
of other countries around the world. Finally, we examine new variables that are specifically 
related to the benefits family firms can derive from political and business connections (e.g. 
tax concessions and greater access to debt). 
 Our results indicate that family firm involvement across industries is not random and 
is related to specific industry conditions. We find that family firms are more involved in 
industries that require greater investment in fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view 
of family owners. We also find that family firms are more involved in industries where there 
is greater potential to consume private benefits of control. We document a positive 
relationship between family firm involvement and performance, which indicates a net 
advantage for family firm shareholders in industries where family firms congregate. This is 
particularly so in high tax industries, where family firms pay less tax than non-family firms. 
Family firms also perform better in industries with lower board independence, which 
suggests their preference to be in these industries is not a disadvantage to shareholders. 
However, we also find that family firms may be utilizing their greater access to debt 
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financing to raise too much debt relative to their industry counterparts and that family firms 
are worth less in industries where they have a bigger control wedge than non-family firms, 
indicating clear disadvantages to shareholders. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides details of 
prior research and develops our hypotheses. Section three describes the data and variables. 
Section four provides the empirical results and discussion. Conclusions are in the final 
section.  
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Prior Literature 
Previous research on family firms has focused on country- and firm-level factors. Family 
ownership has been found to be the dominant form of corporate ownership around the world 
and has been related to country-level factors such as legal origin and investor protection (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). At the firm level, studies 
have examined family firm performance relative to other firms and investigated the specific 
characteristics of family firms. In early studies, family firms were found to perform worse 
than non-family firms (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Morck et al., 2000). However, in later 
studies, Mishra et al. (2001) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family firms perform 
better than other firms, especially when there is a founder CEO. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
reconcile these conflicting results by showing that different relationships exist between 
family ownership, family control, family management and firm performance.  
According to Lane et al. (2006), the typical family firm follows the control model of 
corporate governance, where ownership is concentrated in the hands of the family group and 
members of the family are active in management and on the board of directors. This broad 
involvement by the controlling family group provides both benefits and costs to shareholders 
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in family firms. Benefits include the long-term view of wealth creation by the family group 
compared to the relatively short-term view of hired CEOs (James, 1999), the family’s 
superior knowledge and ability to monitor the operations of the company (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985), the presence of the family’s reputation capital that can result in a lower cost of debt 
(Anderson et al., 2003) and the ability of the family group to create more wealth through 
political and business connections than other owners (Faccio and Parsley, 2009). Costs 
include the increased incentive and opportunity of the family group to expropriate wealth 
from other shareholders. This can occur through excessive compensation, related party 
transactions, special dividends, risk avoidance and remaining active in management even 
when they are no longer competent to run the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson 
et al., 2003; Dahya et al., 2008). 
The only other study to examine family ownership at the industry level is Villalonga and 
Amit (2009). They examine the family control of US firms and industry sectors and find that 
families are more likely to retain control when the efficient scale is small, the need to monitor 
managers and other employees is high, shareholder investment horizons are long and firms 
have dual class stock. The major limitation of their study, however, is that they classify 
industries as being family controlled or not based on family firm participation, while only 
using 26 percent of listed companies. By ignoring the remaining 74 percent of firms, they 
cannot be sure their classification of industries is correct. We overcome this by using the 
population of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, where all firms are classified as 
family or non-family controlled.  
Using data from a non-US market, such as Taiwan, also has other advantages. Taiwan is 
a market with higher family ownership and lower investor protection than the United States, 
which is more representative of other countries around the world. Previous studies also show 
that the characteristics of family firms differ across markets. For example, Villalonga and 
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Amit (2009) show that family firms in the US have lower leverage, while Doukas et al. (2009) 
and Chen and Nowland (2010) show that family firms in Europe and Asia have higher 
leverage than non-family firms. Our results are therefore more likely to be generalizable to 
other markets in Asia and Europe. We also focus on variables that are specifically related to 
the advantages of family ownership (e.g. benefits from political and business connections), 
rather than general characteristics of concentrated ownership. Details of these variables and 
our hypotheses are provided below. 
 
2.2 Advantages of Family Firms 
In this section we highlight three characteristics that we propose are related to family firm 
involvement and performance across industries and may provide advantages to 
shareholders – long-term horizon, access to debt financing and tax concessions.  
 James (1999) shows that family owners generally take a long-term view of the 
success of their firms, compared to the relatively short-term view of other firms with hired 
CEOs. This is because family owners hold a large and undiversified financial and reputation 
investment in the firm and usually expect the firm to remain in the family for generations. In 
non-family firms, CEOs and managers are generally hired on short-term contracts (e.g. 5 
years), which give them more incentive to focus on short-term value maximisation. This 
long-term view of family owners suggests that family firms may be more willing to undertake 
long-term investment, such as invest in fixed assets, than non-family firms. Doukas et al. 
(2009) provide support for this presumption, showing that family firms in Europe invest more 
in fixed-asset capital expenditures than non-family firms.  
 This preference for investment in fixed assets may be unrelated to industry conditions 
as it is possible that family firms invest more in fixed assets than non-family firms across all 
industries. However, we propose that family firms are attracted to two types of industry 
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conditions. First, we expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries with more 
fixed assets. This provides a match between the desire of family firms to invest more in fixed 
assets and industries that require greater investment in fixed assets. Second, we expect family 
firm involvement to be higher in industries where family firms are more willing to invest in 
fixed assets than non-family firms.  
Under these conditions, the tendency for family firms to invest more in fixed assets 
may provide them with a competitive advantage over their industry counterparts. If wealth-
creating investments exist that will be undertaken by family firms, and not other firms, due to 
their tendency to invest more in fixed assets then this creates a comparative advantage for 
shareholders in family firms. But, if the tendency for family firms to invest more in fixed 
assets results in overinvestment and idle capacity then this would be a disadvantage for 
shareholders. Thus, we examine the performance of family firms relative to non-family firms 
in the same industry. 
A number of papers portray cosy relations between business and politics as indicators 
of crony capitalism and corruption, which result in lower investment and economic growth 
(e.g. Mauro, 1995). However, there is evidence that some firms can benefit from close 
relationships with political and business leaders. In particular, Faccio and Parsley (2009) 
provide evidence that family firms create more wealth from political and business 
connections than other firms. The primary benefits of these connections are greater access to 
debt financing and tax concessions from government (Faccio, 2006). There is also more 
general evidence that family firms prefer debt financing over equity financing (Doukas et al., 
2009) and enjoy a lower cost of debt than non-family firms (Anderson et al., 2003).  
This preference for debt financing and greater access to debt through political and 
business connections suggests that family firms are better suited to industries that require 
higher levels of debt. We therefore expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries 
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with more debt. We also expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries where 
family firms can access more debt than their industry counterparts. This, again, may provide 
family firms with a comparative advantage relative to non-family firms, particularly when 
access to debt financing is scarce. With respect to tax, we find it difficult to predict whether 
family firm involvement will be higher in low or high tax industries as all companies are 
expected to prefer lower taxes. However, we expect family firm involvement to be higher in 
industries where family firms pay lower taxes (gain more tax concessions) than non-family 
firms.  
 In addition to family firm involvement, we also relate these industry characteristics 
(fixed assets, debt and tax) to family firm performance. This allows us to examine whether 
the greater involvement of family firms in these industries is associated with a performance 
advantage relative to non-family firms. A positive performance differential indicates that 
family firms provide advantages to shareholders under these industry conditions. 
 
2.3 Disadvantages of Family Firms 
In this section we provide details of three characteristics that are expected to be related to 
family firm involvement and performance across industries and may provide disadvantages to 
shareholders – uncertainty, entrenchment and external monitoring. 
 A number of studies document an increased incentive and opportunity of family 
owners to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. This can occur through excessive 
compensation, related party transactions, special dividends, risk avoidance and remaining 
active in management even when they are no longer competent to run the company 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003). We highlight three characteristics from 
previous research where the potential for consumption of private benefits of control are 
higher. The first is uncertainty or information asymmetry. Studies show that greater 
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uncertainty about the expected performance of firms creates an environment where it is easier 
for family owners to consume private benefits (e.g. Anderson et al., 2009). The second is 
entrenchment, with studies documenting higher agency costs and lower firm performance 
when family owners are entrenched, i.e. have more voting or control rights than ownership 
rights (La Porta et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002). The third is external monitoring 
measured by board independence. Again, studies associate lower board independence with 
higher agency costs in family firms (e.g. Dahya et al., 2008). 
 If family owners are interested in consuming private benefits of control then we 
expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries where there is greater opportunity 
to consume private benefits – higher risk, greater entrenchment or lower board 
independence.1 In addition, the consumption of private benefits of control is not only limited 
to industries where there is greater potential. We also expect consumption of private benefits 
of control to be greater in family firms under conditions where they are riskier, more 
entrenched and have lower board independence than non-family firms in the same industry. 
However, these arguments are based on the potential to consume private benefits of control. 
To find evidence of actual consumption and a disadvantage to shareholders we need to 
document a negative performance differential between family and non-family firms under 
these industry conditions.  
 
2.4 Other Factors 
In this section we cover other factors and arguments related to family firm involvement and 
performance across industries. We first consider the age of firms and industries. As family 
firms tend to be involved in the same industry for generations, it is quite possible that the 
                                                        
1
 While ownership and board independence are generally considered to be firm-level choices, we examine the 
variation across industries – industry effects.  
11 
 
current level of family firm involvement across industries is simply related to the number of 
family firms that entered these industries in their infancy. In Taiwan there is evidence that 
family firms are more involved in older industries (e.g. rubber, cement and plastics) and less 
involved in newer industries (e.g. electronics). We therefore examine whether family firm 
involvement across industries is related to industry age.  
The second factor we examine is competition. If family firms are bigger and older 
than their industry counterparts then they could be in a much stronger competitive position, 
which is generally associated with better performance. We control for this with variables that 
measure the relative age and size of family firms compared to non-family firms. We also 
include a general measure of industry competition (Herfindahl index of market shares). The 
third factor is the value-maximizing size argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). They argue 
that firms need to reach a particular size (efficient scale) to compete successfully in an 
industry, but that the larger the size the more costly it is for controlling owners to maintain 
the same fraction of ownership. This suggests that controlling owners, including families, 
would prefer to operate in industries where the average firm size is smaller. Therefore, we 
test for a negative relationship between family firm involvement and the average firm size in 
industries. 
 Villalonga and Amit (2009) also examine the relationship between monitoring needs 
and family control of industries. Based on the control potential argument of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), they argue that firms with greater uncertainty and less skilled employees need 
more monitoring, which can be effectively provided by a controlling shareholder. In this 
study we frame this argument slightly differently, by using uncertainty as a measure of 
potential consumption of private benefits of control. Both arguments predict the same 
relationship between uncertainty and family firm involvement across industries. However, we 
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expect a negative effect on performance, whereas Villalonga and Amit (2009) expect a 
positive effect.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
Our sample is obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and comprises all 
listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2007. We utilize Taiwanese 
firms as the TEJ database categorizes companies into family-controlled and non-family-
controlled firms. This categorization of all listed companies ensures we correctly measure the 
level of family firm participation in each industry. Industry classifications are obtained from 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange, which classifies companies into 27 domestic industry groups. 
Further division of companies is not possible as segment reporting does not occur in Taiwan. 
Firm financial, ownership and board of directors data is also obtained from the TEJ database. 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
A common definition for family firms used in prior literature is where the founder or 
a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director or 
blockholder in the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Our 
definition of family firms relies on the categorization of firms by the TEJ database, which 
identifies family firms as those where the largest controlling shareholder is a family group 
and at least two family members are involved on the board of directors or in senior 
management. This is slightly more restrictive than the definition used in prior US studies but 
ensures that we are identifying family firms where the family group is more actively involved 
in the company. Non-family firms are categorized by the TEJ database as government-
controlled, management-controlled and widely-held firms. Over the 11-year sample period, 
we have a total of 7661 firm-year observations from 722 firms. Of these, 3482 firm-years are 
from family firms and 4179 from non-family firms.  
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Before examining industry effects we first establish that there are differences between 
family and non-family firms in our sample. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and means 
tests. We find that family firms are significantly bigger, older, have more fixed assets and 
debt and have a lower tax rate than non-family firms. This is consistent with expectations as 
we expect family firms to be more willing to invest in fixed assets, be more able to access 
debt financing and pay less tax than non-family firms. It also indicates that family firms are 
in a strong competitive position as they are bigger and more established than other firms. We 
also find that family firms are riskier, have a higher control wedge and lower board 
independence than non-family firms. These results are also consistent with expectations and 
suggest that greater uncertainty, more entrenched ownership and a lack of external 
monitoring mean there is more potential for consumption of private benefits of control. There 
is no significant difference in the level of ownership. Finally, we find that family firms are 
performing worse than non-family firms as evidenced by both Tobin’s Q and return on assets.  
These results confirm that there are significant differences between family and non-
family firms, which we predict are related to family firm involvement and performance 
across industries. However, to attribute these differences to industry effects we need to 
document three results. First, there is variation in family firm involvement across industries. 
Second, there is variation in our hypothesised characteristics across industries. Third, family 
firm involvement and performance varies across industry conditions as predicted by our 
hypotheses. We therefore aggregate the data at the industry level, which provides us with 297 
industry-year observations over the sample period. We define family firm participation as the 
proportion of family firms in each industry. Family firm market share is the proportion of 
industry sales from family firms. Relative performance is the average Tobin’s Q of family 
firms divided by the average Tobin’s Q of non-family firms in each industry.  
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Table 3 shows the variation in family firm participation, market share and relative 
performance across industries. The table shows that family firm participation across 
industries ranges from 20 to 100 percent. Family firms completely dominate the paper and 
pulp industry and family firm participation is also high in the rubber, glass and ceramics and 
automobile industries. Family firm participation is lowest in the information service, other 
electronic and electrical and cable industries. In unreported results, we find a high correlation 
(0.68) between family firm participation and market share, which is reflected in the relatively 
consistent rankings across the two measures. The correlations between relative performance 
and family firm participation (0.13) and market share (0.19) are lower but still positive, 
suggesting that the performance of family firms is related to where they tend to congregate 
across industries. As further evidence of this relationship, the two highest measures of 
relative performance are in the rubber (1.47) and glass and ceramic (1.35) industries, which 
are also ranked second and third in family firm participation and market share. We cannot 
calculate relative performance for the paper and pulp industry as there are no non-family 
firms. 
Table 4 displays the variation in our hypothesised characteristics. Both average 
industry characteristics and relative firm characteristics are reported. Average industry 
characteristics are calculated as the average of all firms in each industry-year observation. 
Relative firm characteristics are calculated as the average of family firms divided by the 
average of non-family firms in each industry-year observation. There are 297 observations 
for average industry characteristics, but only 286 observations for relative firm characteristics, 
as relative firm characteristics for the paper and pulp industry cannot be calculated. The table 
confirms that there is substantial variation in all characteristics across industries. 
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4. Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis is comprised of three sections. The first section examines whether 
family firm involvement across industries is random or is related to our hypothesised industry 
characteristics. The second section examines whether family firm involvement and industry 
characteristics are related to performance and discusses the combined results. The third 
section details our robustness checks. All analysis is conducted at the industry level and 
models include robust standard errors. 
 
4.1 Family Firm Involvement 
In the prior section we document variation across industries in both family firm involvement 
and our hypothesised characteristics. In this section we test for industry effects by seeing if 
family firm involvement varies across industry conditions as predicted by our hypotheses. 
For example, our descriptive statistics show that family firms have more debt than non-family 
firms. To establish industry effects we need to show higher family firm involvement in high 
debt industries (average industry effect) or higher family firm involvement in industries 
where family firms have more debt than their industry counterparts (relative firm effect). If 
there are no industry effects then family firms will have more debt than non-family firms 
across all industry conditions. 
 Table 5 relates family firm involvement across industries to our hypothesised industry 
characteristics. We expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries with more fixed 
assets, more debt, greater risk, greater entrenchment and lower board independence. We also 
expect family firm involvement to be higher in industries where family firms have more fixed 
assets, more debt, lower tax, greater risk, greater entrenchment and lower board independence 
than their industry counterparts. We use two measures of family firm involvement – 
participation and market share. Participation simply measures the proportion of family firms 
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in each industry, while market share takes into account the relative size of family versus non-
family firms.  
In the first regression, we relate family firm participation to average industry 
characteristics and find positive relationships between family firm participation and fixed 
assets, size and age. We find a negative relationship between family firm participation and 
board independence. In the second regression we introduce relative firm characteristics and 
find positive relationships between family firm participation and fixed assets, control wedge, 
size, age, relative fixed assets and relative tax. We find negative relationships between family 
firm participation and tax, board independence and relative control wedge. The other 
variables are insignificant. 
In the third regression, we relate family firm market share to average industry 
characteristics. We find positive relationships between family firm market share and fixed 
assets and age. We find negative relationships between family firm market share and board 
independence and competition. In the fourth regression, we include both average industry and 
relative firm characteristics. We find positive relationships between family firm market share 
and fixed assets, age, relative tax, relative risk and relative control wedge. We find negative 
relationships between family firm market share and board independence and competition.  
These results confirm that family firm involvement across industries is not random 
and is related to specific industry conditions. Family firms are more involved in industries 
with more fixed assets and in industries where family firms have relatively more fixed assets 
than non-family firms. This is consistent with the long-term view of family owners. Family 
firm involvement is higher in industries with greater entrenchment (control wedge) and lower 
external monitoring (board independence), and in industries where family firms are riskier 
than non-family firms, making it potentially easier for family owners to consume private 
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benefits of control. As expected, we also find that family firm participation is higher in older 
industries and in industries with less competition. 
 There are also a number of unforeseen results. We find that family firm participation 
is higher in low tax industries, suggesting that family firms prefer low tax environments. 
However, we also find that family firm participation is higher when family firms are paying 
higher taxes than their industry counterparts. Here, we can only suggest that family firms 
must have alternative reasons for being in these industries, which more than compensate for 
their poor relative tax position. In contrast to the value-maximizing size argument of Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), we find that family firm participation is greater in industries where the 
average firm size is bigger. This suggests that firm size in Taiwan has not become so large 
that maintaining control is deemed too costly for family owners. We also find conflicting 
results for relative control wedge. In the second regression we find a negative coefficient and 
in the fourth regression we find a positive coefficient. This is likely due to the different 
measure of family firm involvement and suggests that in industries where family firms have a 
higher control wedge than their industry counterparts there are less family firms but the 
family firms are bigger. 
  By comparing the explanatory power (Adj-R2) of the regressions we note that the 
average industry characteristics explain 58 percent and 39 percent of the variation in family 
firm participation and market share. Adding the relative firm characteristics decreases the 
adjusted explanatory power to 54 percent and 35 percent. This indicates that family firm 
involvement across industries is primarily driven by industry characteristics and not relative 
firm characteristics.  
 Finally, we are able to compare our results to the US results of Villalonga and Amit 
(2009). We both find that family firm involvement is higher in industries where there is 
higher entrenchment (more voting or control rights than ownership rights). However, they 
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find that family firm involvement is higher in industries where the average firm size is 
smaller and in younger industries. We find that family firm involvement is higher in 
industries with bigger firms and in older industries. This indicates that the characteristics of 
family firms and the structure of industries differ across countries. 
 
4.2 Relative Performance 
This section relates family firm involvement and industry characteristics to the performance 
of family firms relative to non-family firms. This allows us to examine whether the greater 
involvement of family firms in certain industries provides advantages or disadvantages to 
shareholders. 
 Table 6 presents these results. In the first and second regressions we relate relative 
performance to family firm participation and market share. This directly examines whether 
family firms perform better in industries where they are more involved. In the first regression 
the coefficient on family firm participation is insignificant. In the second regression the 
coefficient on family firm market share is positive. This indicates that family firms perform 
better when family firm market share is higher and indicates a net advantage for family firm 
shareholders in industries where family firms congregate. 
 To ascertain exactly where advantages and disadvantages to shareholders are created 
we relate relative performance to the industry characteristics. In the third regression we find a 
negative relationship between relative performance and board independence. In the fourth 
regression, we introduce relative firm characteristics and find a positive relationship between 
relative performance and tax. We also find negative relationships between relative 
performance and board independence, relative debt, relative control wedge, relative size and 
relative age. Other variables are insignificant. We discuss these results in conjunction with 
those from previous sections. 
19 
 
 In the prior sections we found, consistent with the long-term view of family owners, 
that family firms are more involved in industries with more fixed assets. However, here we 
find no performance effects. This suggests that family firms prefer to invest more in fixed 
assets but this does not provide any measurable advantage to shareholders. It also shows that 
shareholders do not believe that family firms are overinvesting. We predicted family firms to 
be more involved in industries with more debt, but we find no such evidence. We do find that 
family firms perform worse when they have more debt than non-family firms. This suggests 
that family firms may be using too much debt in the eyes of shareholders.  
For tax, we find a number of different results. In this section we find that family firms 
perform better than non-family firms in high tax industries. In unreported testing we 
investigate this further and find that that the median family firm pays 7% less tax than the 
median non-family firm in high tax industries. This suggests that family firms can access 
more tax concessions than non-family firms in high tax industries. In the prior sections, we 
find that family firms are more prevalent in low tax industries, suggesting they prefer low tax 
environments. We also find that family firms are more prevalent in industries where they pay 
more taxes than non-family firms. We repeat that family firms must have alternative reasons 
to be in industries where they are paying more tax. 
 The prior sections provided some evidence that family firms are more involved in 
industries where there is greater potential to consume private benefits of control, e.g. lower 
board independence and higher control wedge. In this section we find mixed results that 
consumption is actually occurring. We find that family firms perform better in industries with 
lower board independence, which suggests their preference to be in these industries is not a 
disadvantage to shareholders. This is consistent with the findings of Chen and Nowland 
(2010), which shows that too much board independence can hinder wealth creation in family 
firms. However, we also find that family firms are worth less in industries where they have a 
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bigger control wedge than non-family firms. This indicates that a higher control wedge than 
industry counterparts is a disadvantage to shareholders. 
 The final results in this section are that family firms are worth less in industries where 
they are bigger and older than non-family firms. This indicates that family firms may not be 
capitalizing on their competitive position (bigger and more established) in these industries. 
The explanatory power of the models in this section also produces contrasting results to the 
previous section. Here, we find that relative performance is driven by relative firm 
characteristics and not industry characteristics. So it seems that family firm participation and 
market share are driven by industry characteristics but performance is driven by relative firm 
characteristics. 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
We recognize that family firm involvement across industries is sticky, as it is not costless to 
close operations in one industry and open operations in another. We specifically use market 
share as a measure of family firm involvement as it has greater variation over time than 
participation. We also use the proportion of total assets of family firms in each industry as an 
alternative measure with consistent results. For relative performance, we use return on assets 
as an alternative performance measure to Tobin’s Q. We find consistent results but the 
significance of the variables is diminished. This suggests that the advantages and 
disadvantages of family firm involvement across industries are not reflected so much in 
current performance but in shareholders perception of future performance. Finally, we use the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets in our analysis as it has a lower correlation with the 
other independent variables than the ratio of total debt to total assets. Using the ratio of total 
debt to total assets provides consistent results but necessitates the presentation of two 
specifications for each model.  
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5. Conclusion 
A number of recent studies document significant differences between family and non-family 
firms. In particular, family owners generally have a longer investment horizon, create more 
wealth through political and business connections and consume more private benefits of 
control. Accordingly, this study proposes that family firm involvement and performance 
across industries is not random. We expect family firms to be to be more involved in 
industries that are better suited to their comparative advantages and where there is more 
potential for family owners to consume private benefits of control. 
 We find that family firms are more involved in industries that require greater 
investment in fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view of the family group, and in 
industry conditions that make it potentially easier for family owners to consume private 
benefits of control. This suggests that family owners either choose to operate in industries 
that have desirable characteristics or that family firms have been relatively more successful in 
these industries over time. Future research could examine the entry and exit of family firms in 
industries over time to further differentiate between these explanations.  
We find a positive relationship between family firm involvement and performance, 
which indicates a net advantage for family firm shareholders in industries where family firms 
congregate. In particular, we find that family firms perform better in high tax industries, 
where family firms pay less tax than non-family firms. Consistent with Chen and Nowland 
(2010) we find that family firms perform better in industries with lower board independence. 
However, we also find evidence that shareholders are disadvantaged in family firms. Family 
firm performance is worse when family firms maintain a higher control wedge and have more 
debt than their industry counterparts.  
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In addition, our analysis indicates that family firm participation and market share are 
driven by industry characteristics but performance is driven by relative firm characteristics. 
This suggests that family firms are intrinsically better suited to certain industry conditions, 
but their performance through time depends on the choices family firms make relative to their 
industry counterparts.  Finally, while we believe our results are generalizable to other similar 
markets in Asia and Europe, we recognize that family firm characteristics may differ across 
markets. For example, other markets can have varying industry structures and different levels 
of direct involvement by government entities. We therefore encourage researchers to conduct 
similar analysis in other markets as we are confident that there will be significant industry 
effects.
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions 
Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
 
Variable Description 
Family firm participation Number of family firms divided by total number of 
industry firms 
Family firm market share Family firm sales divided by total industry sales 
Relative performance Tobin’s Q of family firms divided by Tobin’s Q of non-
family firms in the same industry 
Fixed assets Fixed assets divided by total assets 
Debt Long-term debt divided by total assets 
Tax Tax rate reported in the TEJ database 
Risk Standard deviation of monthly returns over one year 
Ownership Ultimate cash flow rights ownership of the largest 
shareholder as per Claessens et al. (2000) 
Control wedge Ratio of control to cash flow rights ownership of the 
largest shareholder as per Claessens et al. (2000) 
Board independence Number of independent directors divided by total 
number of directors 
Age Age in years since the firm was listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange 
Size Total assets in billions of NT dollars 
Competition Negative of Herfindahl index (sum of squared market 
shares based on sales) 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book value of debt divided 
by book value of assets. 
Return on assets EBITDA divided by total assets 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of sample firms. The firm sample includes 7661 firm-year observations from 722 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange during the period 1997 to 2007. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database. Asterisks 
denote significance of difference in means t-tests as follows: * 10% , ** 5%, *** 1%.   
 
 
Family Firms 
(n=3482) 
Non-Family Firms 
(n=4179) 
 
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Means 
Tests 
Total Assets (NT$ billions) 17.06 45.12 12.90 53.97 4.16*** 
Age (years) 9.48 10.45 4.65 7.11 4.83*** 
Fixed Assets 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.04*** 
Debt 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.03*** 
Tax (%) 14.81 6.79 16.11 8.09 -1.30*** 
Risk 0.78 0.14 0.77 0.18 0.01*** 
Ownership 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.19 -0.01 
Control Wedge 1.45 0.67 1.37 0.64 0.08*** 
Board Independence 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.14 -0.04*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.16 0.56 1.20 0.56 -0.04*** 
Return on Assets (%) 4.50 25.90 6.06 37.48 -1.56** 
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Table 3 – Family Firm Involvement and Performance by Industry 
Average level of family firm participation, market share and relative performance across the 27 industries during the period 1997 to 
2007. The firm sample includes 7661 firm-year observations from 722 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the same 
period. Aggregating at the industry level results in 297 industry-year observations. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data is from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal database.  
 
Industry Firm-
years 
Family Firm 
Participation 
Family Firm 
Market Share 
Relative 
Performance 
Paper & Pulp 77 1.00 1.00 n/a 
Rubber 99 0.89 0.93 1.47 
Glass & Ceramics 55 0.80 0.97 1.35 
Automobile 50 0.78 0.67 0.99 
Cement 77 0.71 0.91 1.11 
Food 220 0.65 0.44 0.63 
Financial & Insurance 349 0.64 0.70 0.93 
Oil, Gas & Electricity 88 0.63 0.84 0.91 
Plastics 230 0.62 0.89 0.81 
Textiles 506 0.61 0.84 1.04 
Consumer Goods 110 0.60 0.57 1.14 
Building Material & Construction 406 0.57 0.62 0.95 
Shipping & Transportation 197 0.56 0.53 1.08 
Tourism 66 0.50 0.64 0.87 
Electric Machinery 395 0.47 0.41 1.04 
Electronic Parts 736 0.43 0.61 1.00 
Chemical & Biotechnology 393 0.42 0.54 0.90 
Other 392 0.42 0.64 0.90 
Iron & Steel 242 0.41 0.30 1.17 
Semiconductor 587 0.40 0.42 1.05 
Computer & Peripheral 592 0.34 0.34 0.89 
Optoelectronic 534 0.32 0.60 1.00 
Electronic Products Distribution 255 0.30 0.61 1.14 
Communications & Internet 350 0.28 0.29 0.98 
Electrical & Cable 132 0.25 0.63 1.20 
Other Electronic 371 0.24 0.43 1.18 
Information Service 109 0.20 0.19 0.67 
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Table 4 – Variation in Industry Characteristics 
Industry characteristics are the average for all firms in the industry. Relative firm characteristics are the average for family 
firms divided by the average for non-family firms in the same industry. The firm sample includes 7661 firm-year 
observations from 722 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 1997 to 2007. Aggregating at the 
industry level results in 297 industry-year observations for the industry characteristics and 286 industry-year observations for 
the relative firm characteristics. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database.  
 Distribution 
 Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
Fixed Assets 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.46 
Debt 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.64 
Tax (%) 9.58 13.38 15.09 17.30 34.52 
Risk 0.23 0.69 0.77 0.84 1.00 
Control Wedge 1.00 1.27 1.33 1.46 1.99 
Board Independence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.24 
Size 0.89 4.63 9.33 19.11 93.45 
Age 0.10 3.74 8.08 13.80 34.29 
Competition -0.88 -0.26 -0.17 -0.09 -0.04 
Relative Fixed Assets 0.13 0.65 1.11 1.89 15.19 
Relative Debt 0.06 0.40 0.99 1.65 10.01 
Relative Tax 0.41 0.87 0.99 1.13 24.89 
Relative Risk 0.18 0.99 1.00 1.02 4.95 
Relative Control Wedge 0.46 0.99 1.09 1.28 1.79 
Relative Board Independence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 6.41 
Relative Size 0.05 0.83 1.57 3.55 836.66 
Relative Age 0.08 0.98 1.50 2.40 47.40 
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Table 5 – Family Firm Involvement and Industry Characteristics 
Regressions relate family firm participation and market share across industries to industry and relative firm characteristics. 
Industry characteristics are the average for all firms in the industry. Relative firm characteristics are the average for family 
firms divided by the average for non-family firms in the same industry. The firm sample includes 7661 firm-year observations 
from 722 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 1997 to 2007. Aggregating at the industry level results 
in 297 industry-year observations for the industry characteristics and 286 industry-year observations for the relative firm 
characteristics. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data is from the Taiwan Economic Journal database. Models include robust 
standard errors. T-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance as follows: * 10% , ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 Family Firm Participation Family Firm Market Share 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.3016 (3.00)*** 
0.3962 
(3.03)*** 
0.4749 
(3.84)*** 
0.1795 
(0.97) 
Fixed Assets 0.4363 (4.34)*** 
0.4347 
(4.26)*** 
0.5571 
(5.16)*** 
0.6046 
(4.42)*** 
Debt -0.0765 (-0.66) 
-0.0233 
(-0.22) 
-0.0403 
(-0.29) 
-0.1203 
(-0.92) 
Tax -0.0025 (-0.74) 
-0.0068 
(-2.23)** 
-0.0037 
(-1.19) 
0.0018 
(0.44) 
Risk -0.0169 (-0.20) 
-0.0117 
(-0.14) 
-0.0231 
(-0.19) 
-0.0418 
(-0.33) 
Control Wedge 0.0668 (1.45) 
0.0827 
(1.70)* 
0.0026 
(0.05) 
-0.0018 
(-0.03) 
Board Independence -0.8929 (-7.57)*** 
-0.7589 
(-6.00)*** 
-0.4580 
(-2.34)** 
-0.7567 
(-3.29)*** 
Size 0.0001 (2.93)*** 
0.0001 
(2.08)** 
-0.0004 
(-0.49) 
-0.0001 
(-1.06) 
Age 0.0158 (10.04)*** 
0.0130 
(7.45)*** 
0.0125 
(7.29)*** 
0.0093 
(4.01)*** 
Competition 0.0570 (0.86) 
0.0245 
(0.34) 
-0.2320 
(-1.85)* 
-0.2608 
(-2.31)** 
Relative Fixed Assets  0.0240 (4.58)***  
-0.0070 
(-0.98) 
Relative Debt  0.0007 (0.10)  
-0.0015 
(-0.16) 
Relative Tax  0.0101 (2.08)**  
0.0087 
(1.84)* 
Relative Risk  0.0325 (0.54)  
0.1323 
(1.64)* 
Relative Control Wedge  -0.1060 (-2.14)**  
0.1339 
(2.01)** 
Relative Board Independence  0.0012 (0.12)  
0.0157 
(0.83) 
Relative Size  -0.0002 (-1.22)  
0.0001 
(0.35) 
Relative Age  -0.0031 (-0.88)  
-0.0015 
(-0.46) 
Adj-R2 
 
0.58 0.54 0.39 0.35 
n 297 286 297 286 
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Table 6 – Relative Performance, Involvement and Industry Characteristics 
Regressions relate family firm relative performance across industries to industry and relative firm characteristics. Industry 
characteristics are the average for all firms in the industry. Relative firm characteristics are the average for family firms 
divided by the average for non-family firms in the same industry. The firm sample includes 7661 firm-year observations 
from 722 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 1997 to 2007. Aggregating at the industry level 
results in 286 industry-year observations for the relative firm characteristics. Variables are defined in Table 1. Data is from 
the Taiwan Economic Journal database. Models include robust standard errors. T-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote significance as follows: * 10% , ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 Relative Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.9089 (14.89)*** 
0.8609 
(16.10)*** 
0.9272 
(4.46)*** 
1.1474 
(3.07)*** 
Family Firm Participation 0.2244 (1.61)    
Family Firm Market Share  0.2679 (2.65)***   
Fixed Assets   -0.2328 (-0.59) 
-0.0543 
(-0.12) 
Debt   -0.2643 (-1.03) 
-0.2442 
(-1.00) 
Tax   0.0024 (0.42) 
0.0137 
(1.85)* 
Risk   -0.0622 (-0.38) 
-0.1316 
(-0.79) 
Control Wedge   0.1014 (0.86) 
-0.0802 
(-0.64) 
Board Independence   -0.5375 (-2.07)** 
-0.8101 
(-2.50)** 
Size   -0.0001 (-0.86) 
0.0002 
(0.12) 
Age   0.0049 (1.14) 
-0.0020 
(-0.42) 
Competition   -0.1430 (-0.78) 
-0.3082 
(-1.56) 
Relative Fixed Assets    -0.0036 (-0.26) 
Relative Debt    -0.0474 (-2.61)*** 
Relative Tax    0.0076 (0.67) 
Relative Risk    0.2961 (1.15) 
Relative Control Wedge    -0.2610 (-2.11)** 
Relative Board Independence    -0.0148 (-0.45) 
Relative Size    -0.0008 (-2.62)*** 
Relative Age    -0.0168 (-3.05)*** 
Adj-R2 
 
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.11 
n 286 286 286 286 
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Executive Summary 
Family firms are an integral part of most economies around the world, comprising an average 
of 59% of listed firms in Asia (ex-Japan) and 44% in Europe. However, little is known about 
the involvement and performance of family firms across industries. A number of recent 
studies document significant differences between family and non-family firms. In particular, 
family owners generally have a longer investment horizon, create more wealth through 
political and business connections and consume more private benefits of control. Accordingly, 
this study proposes that family firm involvement and performance across industries is not 
random. We expect family firms to be to be more involved in industries that are better suited 
to their comparative advantages and where there is more potential for family owners to 
consume private benefits of control. 
We make significant advances on previous research by being the first to examine the 
involvement and performance of family firms across industries using the entire population of 
listed companies and over an 11-year period. Villalonga and Amit (2009) draw implications 
about the family control of industries in the United States using a sample of 26 percent of 
listed companies in a single year. We examine family firms in Taiwan, a non-US market with 
high family ownership and relatively lower investor protection, which is more representative 
of other countries around the world. Finally, we examine new variables that are specifically 
related to the benefits family firms can derive from political and business connections (e.g. 
tax concessions and greater access to debt). 
 Our results indicate that family firm involvement across industries is not random and 
is related to specific industry conditions. We find that family firms are more involved in 
industries that require greater investment in fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view 
of family owners. We also find that family firms are more involved in industries where there 
is greater potential to consume private benefits of control. This suggests that family owners 
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choose to operate in industries that have desirable characteristics or that family firms have 
been more successful in these industries over time. 
 We document a positive relationship between family firm involvement and 
performance, which indicates a net advantage for family firm shareholders in industries 
where family firms congregate. This is particularly so in high tax industries, where family 
firms pay less tax than non-family firms. Family firms also perform better in industries with 
lower board independence, which suggests their preference to be in these industries is not a 
disadvantage to shareholders. However, we also find that family firms may be utilizing their 
greater access to debt financing to raise too much debt relative to their industry counterparts 
and that family firms are worth less in industries where they have a bigger control wedge than 
non-family firms, indicating clear disadvantages to shareholders. 
Finally, our analysis indicates that family firm participation and market share are 
driven by industry characteristics but performance is driven by relative firm characteristics. 
This suggests that family firms are intrinsically better suited to certain industry conditions, 
but their performance through time depends on the choices family firms make relative to their 
industry counterparts.  
